A TRAP IN THE LEBANON

By Danny Reshef

The tired and weather-beaten sign that crowns the IDF outposts in Lebanon announces that "Our Goal is to Defend the Settlements of the North". It is now clear that the price to achieve that goal will have to be paid by the residents of the Golan Heights. One may ask whether they do not deserve protection against their cynical treatment at the hands of our leaders.

Syrian President Hafez el-Assad has agreed to resume negotiations with Israel. At the same time, he has retracted his consistent demand that Israel agree in advance to withdraw from the entire Golan Heights, down to the lines of June 4, 1967.

Most observers believe that this decision stems from concern over the possible unilateral evacuation of the IDF from Lebanon by July of 2000, without any prior agreement between the parties.

If that is correct, then Assad's decision clearly illustrates that the presence of the IDF in Lebanon was an invaluable strategic asset for the Syrians, since they appreciate the seriousness of the Israel's intentions to withdraw.

Furthermore, the current state of Syria's economy and armed forces, and its low standing in the international community oblige them to enter negotiations in order to frustrate Israel's exit from Lebanon, since any other means would cost them dearly.

While the sides to a dispute are negotiating, it is understood that no side should take one-sided steps on issues that are included on the agenda and may be resolved in the course of the negotiations.

It is difficult to visualize the Prime Minister of Israel carrying out a withdrawal from Lebanon during the talks, certainly not at their start, without some sort of agreement with the Syrians. It is clear that such an agreement would require paying a price on the Golan Heights.

By agreeing to resume the talks, Assad has converted in one stroke the concern over a unilateral Israeli withdrawal to a valuable asset in the talks with Israel. He has thus posed the difficult dilemma before our Prime Minister of choosing between three paths of action.

Barak may decide to pay the Syrians the full price demanded for a withdrawal from Lebanon, or withdraw unilaterally during the talks (which would sour the atmosphere of the negotiations and probably expose him to American pressure) or break his pre-election promises.

For years it was explained to our public that the objective of the IDF presence in Lebanon is to protect the northern settlements. Now it suddenly turns out that for years the IDF presence in Lebanon has been serving the express interests of the Syrians and that the Syrians lack any practical possibility to dog our footsteps back to the international border with bloodhounds of terror.

Furthermore, our leaders cynically viewed the IDF, on the one hand, as a pawn in the negotiations with Syria. On the other hand, they were offering a prize to the Israeli public along the road to holding a referendum on the future of the Golan.

The tired and weather-beaten sign that crowns the IDF outposts in Lebanon announces that "Our Goal is to Defend the Settlements of the North". It is now clear that the price to achieve that goal will have to be paid by the residents of the Golan Heights. One may ask whether they do not deserve protection against their cynical treatment at the hands of our leaders.