Who's Afraid of the Hizballah?

Neither Iranian encouragement nor directives from Syria motivate Hizballah attacks. The organization is an authentic representative of the poor Shi'ite population and it is sensitive to their needs and to their misery

Rather than a sense of security, the presence of the IDF in South Lebanon radiates a sense of helplessness and a negative feeling of conceptual fixation on the parts of the decision-makers, particularly due to attitudes within the IDF and the security system. The prevalent Israeli approach in relation to Lebanon stems greatly from Lebanon’s comparison to a no man’s land containing militia operated by foreign forces. This comparison provides legitimacy to establishing a security zone and maintaining a private militia on Lebanese soil, in the image of the SLA. However, this approach ignores the changes that have begun to occur in Lebanon over recent years, as well as the considerations, the constraints and especially the goals of all sides involved in the war in Lebanon.

As of 1991, Lebanon has been undergoing a swift process of rehabilitation both in its economy and its state institutions, taking place under the guidance, and with the support, of Syria, thanks to whom Lebanon again operates as a state after 16 years of civil conflict. The efficiency of the Lebanese government in the enforcement of law and order has resulted in an atmosphere of stability and confidence in most regions of the state. During this period there have been two national elections to parliament, which took place relatively quietly, under Syria’s surveillance.

The fixing of the currency and the renewal of economic activities have brought on a renewal of faith in Lebanon’s economy by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and an upswing in tourism in the country. International businesses are also gradually returning to operation in Beirut. In the south, new construction and renovations in the Shi’ite public sector are taking place (financed primarily by savings of citizens who were employed in the oil states), reflecting optimism and hope for political and economic stablility. All these also reflect a significant Syrian interest, which is too important to risk in operations against Israel. More important than anything, the militiae (aside from the Hizballah) have been disarmed, under Syria’s supervision. Many militia people have joined the Lebanese army, which has been reorganized and re-equipped, and has acquired operational capability it never had before. Today this army has more than 50,000 soldiers, more than twice the quantity it had on the eve of the civil war. In the past the Lebanese army lacked the ability to enforce government wishes or to defend it. Over the last few years, once the clannish structure of its departments had been abolished, the army proved its strength in an operation against violent rebel forces (both Christian and Shi’ite), including radicals from the Hizballah. The Lebanese army will be able to enforce its authority on the Hizballah if and when Israel withdraws to the international border. The government of Israel’s proposal to the Lebanese government in the spring of 1998, to implement resolution 425 within the agreement of security arrangements between them, expressed a recognition of this capability.

The sole reason for the war being fought against the IDF is its actual presence on sovereign Lebanese soil, which is considered to be occupation in every sense of the word. Neither Iranian encouragement nor directives from Syria motivate Hizballah attacks in the security area. Hizballah’s motives and considerations are fundamentally independent and stem from the needs of the internal Lebanese arena. The organization is an authentic representative of the poor, Shi’ite population in South and West Beirut, in the Lebanese valley and in the southern portion of the country, and it is attentive to their needs and their misery. Despite Iranian financial and military support, and despite Syria’s granting them freedom of operations, Hizballah is fairly autonomous, both legally (against Iran) and politically (against Syria). Hizballah has demonstrated its independence from Syria more than once in the past, and has suffered painfully for doing so.

Battle against the IDF is an important tool in the crystallization of Hizballah’s political status in the Lebanese area, particularly in the competition with its rival organization, Amal, for support from the Shi’ite population. However, its fighting efforts are marginal in comparison to its political activity (including representation in parliament) and its widespread social activity, which include welfare services, education and defense for its supporters. The IDF’s withdrawal from Lebanon may deprive the Hizballah from an important political asset, but the organization will probably not attack on sovereign Israeli soil, as this may endanger the peace and welfare of South Lebanese residents.

Hizballah leaders have declared in the past that they will continue to fight Israel until “Jerusalem is liberated”, but they have often said the opposite. as well. Supposedly, their goal is the liberation of Lebanese soil, and it is not in their interest to continue to act against Israel after this goal has been achieved. This very attitude received backing from the Iranian government in December 1998. Hizballah’s political (or Islamic) goals are restricted to Lebanon, and there too there has been a considerable retreat from the goal of transforming Lebanon to a country governed by Islamic law, from a recognition of the unique clannish mosaic of the country. From a practical point of view, Hizballah, as opposed to other Palestinian organizations that fought Israel herself, has never instigated action against Israel on her sovereign soil, and has confined itself to Lebanon. Although Hizballah geurilla fighters have often reached the border fence, they have never actually entered Israel. Without a doubt, they could have. The organizations insists on maintaining the understandings from Grapes of Wrath, and its ketushya rocket attacks on northern Galil settlements has almost always been in reaction to the IDF’s and SLA’s wounding of Lebanese civilians.

Amal, whose people comprise the nucleus of the Lebanese army, enjoys Syrian support and sees the Hizballah as a bitter rival that threatens its senior status in the Shi’ite hierarchy. Amal, like the entire Lebanese political system, claims that with the withdrawal of the IDF from southern Lebanon, all violent actions against Israel from Lebanese soil would cease. In actuality, the withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon will permit the Lebanese government to put a stop to the Hizballah’s armed activities, to disarm it and restrict it to social-political affairs. Instead of the Hizballah, the Lebanese government is striving to establish a Lebanese army presence behind Unifil forces, which will stretch along the entire border with Israel.

In all of the considerations regarding the withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon, the establishment of Unifil has been forgotten, a force of four brigades stationed north of the security area, that continues to sit idly by, with nothing to do. Since 1998, Israel has not permitted Unifil to fulfill its role as defined by the UN Security Council, and has preferred to rely on the SLA instead. Unifil headquarters have made it clear that if Israel unilaterally withdraws to the international border, her forces will immediately fall out along the border, with the Lebanese army behind them. Unifil will act in accordance with its mandate and will not require approval from either Lebanon or Syrian governments.

The threat of renewed activity by Palestinian terror organizations against northern settlements – with or without Syria’s missives – after Israel’s withdrawal to the international border, is not impossible. However, it is only speculative, is not based on intelligence information, and ignores the interest of the south Lebanese population to return to the way things were before Israel entered Lebanon in 1982. Despite all of this, Israel insists on official security arrangements with the Lebanese government, and this is actually conditional on complete agreement with Syria – and it is not at all clear when this may be achieved, if at all.

Up to now, Israel has rejected the option of unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon, based on an unofficial understanding with the government of Lebanon on the mutual honoring of security from both sides of the border. This is exactly what the prime minister of Lebanon, Salim Al-Hoss, was alluding to in mid March, in matters regarding the willingness of his government to recognize the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon (signed in 1949) and to prevent guerilla attacks against Israel, if she would withdraw unilaterally and with no international border conditions. Precisely because Syria is the true ruler of Lebanon, this statement was probably made on Damascus’ authority, and thus its great importance. A similar message was already heard a year ago from Amal leader Nabih Birri, regarding the possibility that a joint ceasefire committee would serve as a mechanism for the administration of southern Lebanon after Israeli withdrawal to the international border.

The Israeli government’s continued insistence on an official security arrangement with Lebanon, which would provide legitimacy for Israel's withdrawal from Lebanese soil, does not permit it to take advantage of this window of opportunity. Israel’s standing on the official agreement, legitimacy or none, is neither practical nor necessary for the security of the northern settlements. There is a great fear that the Israeli army remains mired in the deep swamp of Lebanon, not because there is no other way to defend the international border but because its politicians are not willing to pay the political price involved in a unilateral withdrawal.

Dr. Avraham Sela is a university lecturer in the faculty of International Relations at Hebrew University, served as an intelligence officer with the rank of lieutenant colonel, and was a member of the Israeli delegation to the Naqura talks.

This article was first published in Ha'aretz, on March 31, 1999.