By Ze'ev
Schiff, “ha’aretz, 12.5.00
The Israel
Defense Force has left places in the past that were not part of any peace
treaty.At the end of the War of Independence (1948-49), the IDF pulled out of
southern Lebanon after it had captured 14 Lebanese villages during fighting. It
also withdrew from El Arish in the Sinai desert and from two sectors of the
Gaza Strip.
Soon after the
Sinai Campaign of 1956, the IDF was forced under heavy American and
international pressure, to evacuate all of the Sinai Peninsula. No peace treaty
was signed at the time with Egypt, although there were American guarantees.
After the Yom Kippur War (1973), the IDF withdrew from parts of the Sinai and
Golan Heights. In Lebanon, a number of pullbacks were implemented after the
1982 War of Lebanon - again without any signed agreement. Incidentally, those
pullbacks were accompanied by something else - terrorist operations against
Israeli targets.
What is unique
about the coming IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon is not the absence of a
signed agreement, but the fact that it is being conducted under a barrage of
fire from forces that do not belong to any regular army. There have been
occasions when our political leaders have decided on a withdrawal despite
opposition from senior IDF commanders.
The 1957
withdrawal from Sinai was carried out although chief of staff Moshe Dayan and
his successor Haim Laskov were strongly opposed. Following the War of
Independence, Yigal Allon denounced the hasty pullout from El Arish and the
Sinai.
The withdrawal
from southern Lebanon is also unique because of both the pressure of Israeli
public opinion and the debate in the Arab world. Israelis are sick of Lebanon.
The numerous casualties there have led to this decision by our political
leadership, and that decision was born in the last general election campaign.
For the first
time in Israeli military history, we have been defeated by an enemy engaged in
psychological warfare, including a sophisticated use of the Israeli media.
Apparently, Israel's endurance is at a new low, although there will be
additional tests of our stamina further down the road.
In the Arab
world, more and more people are saying the only language Israel understands is
the language of force, and that only force achieves withdrawals of IDF troops.
Proponents cite the Palestinian intifada and the war Hezbollah waged against
Israel.
This line of
thought runs counter to the philosophy that has been the guideline of Egypt's
leaders since the Camp David Peace Accords - that only peace agreements and
security arrangements, not war, can persuade Israel to conduct withdrawals. At
present, no one knows how the approach of Hezbollah and Hamas will affect
either the Palestinians or the Arab states.
The steps that
lie ahead - first, the withdrawal and then Israel's behavior afterward - will
determine a great deal. The test of strength will not be a military one.
Hezbollah
understands this and Israel can expect that organization to provide us with two
acid tests that will have an impact on the way we - and others - view our
deterrent strength.
In the first
test, Hezbollah will try to create the impression that the IDF is fleeing
rather than conducting an orderly withdrawal. It will thus seek ways to carry
out rear assaults on the retreating troops. The IDF must not leave Lebanon with
its tail between its legs, and must display operational resourcefulness. The
Americans faced a similar problem when they pulled out of Vietnam - the reason
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recommended that bombing be stepped up not
only in Vietnam but also in Cambodia. Even the beleaguered Serbs made an effort
to withdraw their troops from Kosovo with their heads held high.
A lot will
depend on how Israel treats the members of the South Lebanon Army and the
soldiers families. The SLA question is more difficult and more complex than the
mechanics of pulling out of a defined territory in southern Lebanon.
Hezbollah and
Syria want to humiliate Israel and show how it abandons an ally - the SLA.
Thus, the approach must be that, if there is no signed agreement on the SLA, to
take our cue from what Iran allows itself in providing assistance to both
Hezbollah and the Islamic Jihad and what Syria allows itself in supporting both
Hezbollah and Hamas.
In other
words, Israel can allow itself to help the SLA if, after the withdrawal from
Southern Lebanon, it attempts to defend its villages until the situation in the
region quiets down, and until the Lebanese government establishes its
sovereignty there.
The second
test relates to the period after the withdrawal. There are differing views over
how things will develop once we are no longer in southern Lebanon.
If the
situation deteriorates, it is doubtful whether there will be any way of
preventing Israeli operations against the Syrians and their interests in
Lebanon. The Israel Air Force's last strike against the Damascus-Beirut highway
sent a clear signal of what could be in the cards.
If tensions
escalate, the result might be that the IAF will be forced to do in Lebanon what
the NATO air forces did in Kosovo.