Is an analysis of Military Intelligence worth anything?

By Danny Reshef October 28, 1999

When we hear analyses from the Military Intelligence Branch (MIB) on what we can expect in the Lebanon, we would do well to remember that in the past few decades the analyses of the MIB have again and again turned out to be false. Furthermore, in the task of understanding the processes at work and in discovering the essential prospects for the future, many people have done better than all the analysts of the MIB combined, namely newspaper writers, journalists, academics, intellectuals, politicians, and even ordinary interested citizens. Indeed, the time has come for a clean sweep of the cobwebs in the intelligence community.

At the beginning of 1967, the annual analysis of the MIB predicted that "war is not expected during the next three years". This prediction was based upon the difficulties of the Egyptian army in its campaign in the Yemen. As is well known, war with Egypt broke out on June 6, 1967.

In the summer of 1968, military service with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on the banks of the Suez Canal was a rather pleasant experience. The MIB had estimated that the Egyptians lack any so-called option of the use of force. This estimate was based upon the fire-bombing of the Suez oil refineries in retaliation for the sinking of the Israeli destroyer "Eilat" on October 21, 1967. The burning of the refineries allegedly caused tremendous economic damage to the Egyptians and exposed their weakness.

Yet on October 26, 1968, the Egyptians surprised us by opening fire all along the Canal. Fourteen IDF soldiers were killed on the very first day, just when they were in the middle of a football match, and eleven more fell in action during the next few days. It was only after this surprise attack that the IDF began the urgent discussions that resulted in the construction of the Bar-Lev line of fortifications.

The surprise attack opened a War of Attrition that contained all the elements of the Yom Kippur War, that is, an iron-clad Concept that fostered a complacent attitude about the ability of the Egyptians to spring a surprise. The low level of alertness among the front-line soldiers closely reflected this frame of mind. The only difference between the surprise attack of October 1967 and that of October 1968 was in the intensity of the onslaught. The surprise attack on the Yom Kippur holy day in October of 1973 was an improved, more ambitious and more successful edition of the 1968 disaster.

On November 19, 1977, President Sadat landed in Israel. When the plan of this visit became known, the Israeli Chief of General Staff (Lieutenant General Mordechai Gur, now deceased) had trusted the information fed to him by the MIB and therefore warned against another Egyptian trick.

On June 6, 1982, the IDF initiated the military operation named Peace for the Galilee to implement a planned political objective. It is fair to say that this time the MIB objected to the plan, which relied upon an analysis of the Mossad that there is a well-organized local Christian force which is capable to rule Lebanon. To this very day, we are breaking our heads over how to extricate ourselves from that country.

On December 9, 1987, our security forces were completely surprised by the outbreak of the Intifada. This was in the face of widespread coverage of statements in the press by politicians and intellectuals who had warned, during the two preceding years, that the peace and quiet in the occupied areas could not continue much longer. After the outbreak of the riots, about two years went by until the proper procedures for combating the rioters were formulated but not before there appeared embarrassing phenomena of amoral behavior in the field.

On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. As usual, this move surprised the security establishment. Israel found itself unprepared, despite the fact that everyone had known for a long time the elements of the Iraqi threat. They had developed long-range missiles and chemical weapons, had already used them in the field and declared a willingness to use them again. Iraq had always been a very powerful potential enemy and our intelligence services should have focused their interest in that direction.

In its annual report towards 1993, the MIB predicted that "there is no breakthrough expected this year on the Palestinian track". The reason was that the minimal requirements of the Palestinians do not meet the maximum willingness of the Israelis to make concessions. Nevertheless, on September 13, 1993, the Oslo accords were signed.

In effect, the MIB has failed time after time to understand the real forces that motivate society in the Middle East. This is clearly reflected in the report of the State Comptroller, the retired Justice Eliezer Goldberg, which was submitted to the Knesset on October 5, 1999. This report deals with the intelligence community and states that the conclusions of the Agranat Commission of 1973 have either not been implemented or have withered on the branch of the tree. In fact, there is no so-called pluralism of research. He adds that strategic research is deficient and suffers from a severe shortage of proper investigators.

In conclusion, when we hear analyses from the Military Intelligence Branch (MIB) on what we can expect in the Lebanon, we would do well to remember that in the past few decades the analyses of the MIB have again and again turned out to be false. Furthermore, in the task of understanding the processes at work and in discovering the essential prospects for the future, many people have done better than all the analysts of the MIB combined, namely newspaper writers, journalists, academics, intellectuals, politicians, and even ordinary interested citizens. Indeed, the time has come for a clean sweep of the cobwebs in the intelligence community.