The new red line

By Ze'ev Schiff,Ha’aretz, 8.6.00

The closer the date for the withdrawal from Lebanon drew, the harsher Prime Minister Ehud Barak's threats became regarding Israel's response in the event of an attack on it after the withdrawal. In his warnings, Barak outlined a new "red line" in Lebanon, and not just in the South, from where the IDF withdrew.In a visit to Zar'it on May 22, Barak said that Israel's response to an attack on its soldiers or civilians after the withdrawal would be painful, and would not necessarily hurt villages in the security zone. On the same day, speaking by satellite transmission to an AIPAC convention in Washington, Barak stated things more explicitly, setting a clear address for the response: Israel views Syria and Lebanon as responsible for maintaining order and preventing escalation, Barak said. If they or their messengers attack Israel after the withdrawal, Israel will respond with a firm hand. Foreign Minister David Levy added his own warnings. Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz stated things even more clearly regarding Syria. For some reason, Barak and all the other speakers ignored one other player, Iran, which has links with the Hezbollah and which supplies it with arms and ammunition, training and money.

Leaders who draw "red lines" usually make an effort to leave them as vague as possible so as not to create a situation in which not realizing the threat is perceived as a sign of weakness. In some cases, the threat is very clear but its realization does not require immediate action. That is what happened when Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli traffic in 1953, despite the fact that Israel had warned that it would view this as a pretext for war. The Israeli reaction was delayed until the 1956 Sinai War. In 1967, on the other hand, Israel reacted immediately to the closing of the Straits.

On paper, the new red line in Lebanon seems simple and clear, but reality could present Barak and Israel with complex situations. For example, will Israel consider reconnaissance flights by Syrian war-planes over Lebanon, with Lebanese approval, after Israel stops its flights there, as the crossing of a "red line"? Does the Israeli warning cover a scenario in which Hezbollah attacks IDF soldiers not in Israeli territory, but in the occupied territory of Har Dov? After all, it does not matter if this is occupied land in Lebanon, as the Lebanese government and Hezbollah claim, or occupied land in Syria, as claimed by Israel and the UN surveyors.

And more: How will Israel react if a lone Hezbollah man attacks Israelis? The history of the Israeli-Arab conflict is full of incidents of a "lone nutcase," a soldier who opens fire and kills Israelis on his own initiative. There were such cases in Jordan both before the signing of the peace agreement and after it, such as the murder of seven Israeli schoolgirls from Beit Shemesh by a Jordanian soldier in March 1997. Israel also had its own "lone nutcase:" Kiryat Arba settler Baruch Goldstein, who gunned down 29 Muslim worshipers in the Cave of the Patriarchs in February 1994. Will the action of a lone Hezbollah man now move Israel to an immediate massive reaction? Will we destroy a bridge in Lebanon for one such attack, and respond to another attack by also destroying a power station there? Many Israelis, including within the government, believe that this is what should be done. The strategic logic, on the other hand, calls for avoiding such automatic reactions. In order to prevent misunderstandings in the Israeli public, things must be explained properly, today, and not when we are forced to act or refrain from acting, as the case may be.

In this context, one must also take into account the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. There is a possibility that the Hezbollah and Syria will recruit men from the refugee camps in Lebanon, where the refugee problem is more acute than anywhere else in the Arab world, and organize them to attack Israel. The responsibility will of course be the Lebanese government's and whoever is behind organizing the Palestinians. But the problem will also affect Yasser Arafat. Arafat is currently concerned over the possibility that in such an event Israel will react against the refugee camps in Lebanon. The question is, what is Arafat's responsibility as the national leader of the Palestinians? If he does not control them, then he cannot claim that he represents them all. If he does not represent them in issues of war and attacking Israel, why should we accept the assumption that he represents all Palestinian refugees, and not only on the issue of the compensation they are demanding?

There is also another possibility: To find a common interest for Israel and Arafat regarding the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, who are once again liable to be exploited by other parties with violent intentions