Time for a hasty withdrawal

Dan Margalit, Ha’aretz”, 30.3.00


Last year, Prime Minister Ehud Barak realized that Syria was opposed to a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, even though United Nations Resolution 425 requires Israel to carry out such a withdrawal. Barak made a commitment to withdraw from Lebanon by July 2000 and added that this would be done in conjunction with an agreement with Syria. But he was left without a convincing answer when asked what he would do if Syria failed to live up to his expectations. Barak kept waiting for Syrian President Hafez Assad. During the past month, the government took another step toward making the withdrawal a reality when it decided that, in the absence of a political accord, Israel would withdraw from the security zone unilaterally. This would be the lesser evil, but several ministers - Yossi Sarid, for one - warned that such a move could actually become a political and military trap that would eventually impel Israel to renew the fighting in Lebanon with even greater vigor.

Syria and Lebanon cautioned Israel not to withdraw the IDF to the border. Employing some twisted and inexplicable reasoning, they threatened that an Israeli redeployment to the international border could lead to war. What's the logic here? What's the rationale? They don't ask such questions in the Arab world. But even in the Lebanese press, someone dared to argue that if Israel leaves, then Syria will also have to pull up its stakes in the land of the renowned cedars. This brought home to Assad the jeopardy that his continued control of Beirut could be in, should Israel leave Lebanon on its own.

The reasonable assumption was, therefore, that it would be worthwhile for Israel to put off the withdrawal until July in order to try to reach an accord with Syria before then. But with the failure of the meeting between Clinton and Assad, the wheel has turned and a new reality has been created that raises the question of whether there's any point in continuing to adhere to the timetable set by the government - of waiting another month to discuss the issue of the withdrawal - even if it's to be a unilateral one.

The thinking behind sticking to the original schedule goes something like this: Even though the Geneva summit failed, it still leaves several weeks for possible Israeli-Syrian talks and, if so, what's the point in rushing ahead with a unilateral withdrawal?

According to this outlook, the logic that was correct for the days before the summit still holds true despite the meeting's outcome.

But it isn't so. The door that Assad slammed in Clinton's face attests to the fact that the Israeli threat to unilaterally withdraw from Lebanon is not sufficient in itself to bear political fruit. In the wake of the failed summit, there are two possibilities: the first is that Assad prefers to deal with the difficulties he can expect to face within the Arab world following a unilateral Israeli withdrawal, just so long as he's not compelled to soften his stance regarding several hundred meters on the northeastern side of the Kinneret; the second is that Assad does not believe that Barak will in fact give the order for a unilateral withdrawal.

The Syrian president may well be presuming that, just like him, the Israeli prime minister is engaging in nothing more than a game of brinkmanship.

Both possibilities lead to the same conclusion as far as what policy Israel should adopt: There is no point in waiting another month for the government to debate the issue. If the threat of a unilateral withdrawal isn't going to get Assad back to the bargaining table, then what's the point of waiting for him in the security zone outposts until July? We could be heading home already.

And if it turns out that Assad is betting on Israel not daring to go ahead with a unilateral withdrawal, then an actual move in the field might shake up his thinking. Maybe the sight of Israeli tanks returning to Metullah will have an effect and spur Syria to come back to the negotiating table.

It appears that a bullet cocked in the barrel isn't enough to move the Syrian president; perhaps a bullet that has been fired - namely, a tangible move to demonstrate that the withdrawal is taking place - will help bring Damascus into bargaining mode.

Up until the Geneva summit, there was a basis for arguing that we should remain in the security zone as a means of accelerating negotiations. Now the opposite is true. A hasty exit offers some chance for a renewal of talks. It's worth a try, especially since there is nothing to lose.