LEXICON WITH COMMENTARY ABOUT THE SECURITY ZONE IN SOUTH LEBANON

(UPDATED TO SEPTEMBER 1999)

Please send your comments to Danny Reshef by e-mail:
reshef-h@inter.net.il

The organization Amal takes its name from the initial capitals of its full name in Arabic, that is, Afuaj Mukauma Lubnaniyeh, which means The Battalions of the Lebanese Resistance. The word itself Amal means Hope in Arabic.

The movement was established in 1975 as the military arm of the Shi'ite protest movement called The Movement of the Deprived. The protest movement had been established in 1970 by the Shi'ite Imam of Lebanon, Mussa S'adr, in order to conduct a political struggle to eliminate the discrimination against the Shi'ites in the Lebanese corridors of power.

The civil war in Lebanon, which broke out in 1975, led to the establishment of the military arm, which was secretive at first. The aim was to join the struggle against the hegemony of the Christians in the nation. The movement also challenged the heads of the Shi'ite clans in the Lebanon, claiming that they had perpetuated the discrimination against the community for the benefit of their own personal status. The movement regarded itself as a Lebanese Shi'ite National Movement that aspires to reform the Lebanese state for the benefit of the Shi'ites, rather than as an Islamic, Pan-Arabic or ideological movement.

In circumstances that are still not clear today, the Iman Mussa S'adr disappeared in Libya in 1978, leaving behind a vacuum in the leadership. On April 25, 1980, the heads of Amal chose a 42-year old lawyer, Nebih Mustapha Berri, to be the commander of the military arm. In the absence of any other acceptable candidates, Berri became the de facto leader of the movement. Under his leadership, Berri has defined the goals of the movement as follows.
A. For an independent, sovereign, secular and democratic state.
B. For democratic equality for the Shi'ites, that is, one person- one vote.
The background is that at present, the Shi'ites comprise 40 percent of the population but may elect only 25 percent of the members of Parliament, whereas the Christians comprise only 25 percent of the population and may elect 50 percent of the members of Parliament.
(Refer to the item 20 below on the Taif Agreement.)
C. Against Israel as a foreign occupier by waging war within Lebanon while maintaining good neighborly relations across the Lebanon-Israel international boundary line.

Between 1988 and 1990, there were two rounds of battle between Amal and the Hizbollah about policy and the hegemony over the Shi'ite community, in which the Hizbollah defeated Amal.
(Refer to the item 5 below on the political history of Hizbollah.)

By planting a network of agents inside Amal during the struggle, the Hizbollah managed to wipe out tens of Amal's senior and intermediate level leaders. This left Amal without a reservoir of future leaders of the organization.
(Refer to the item 6 below on the history of Hizbollah terror.)

The results of this struggle greatly weakened Amal and increased its dependence upon the Syrians. The Syrians pressured Amal in 1992 and in 1996 to participate in the elections in partnership with the Hizbollah. Despite the common platform, the elections showed that Amal still has a strong hold upon the Shi'ite community as opposed to the Hizbollah. On the face of it, Amal competes with the Hizbollah in the struggle against Israel to repel a foreign invader, but their military strikes are so few and so poorly executed that they are regarded as no more than a nuisance.

Nowadays, Amal is suffering from a crisis of leadership. Their leader, Nebih Berri, is seen to be corrupt. His son, Abdullah, leads the movement in everyday affairs and is urging to intensify the struggle against Israel. It is doubtful whether the movement is able to unite the Shi'ites and improve their conditons in the Lebanon. The Shi'ite powder keg in the Lebanon has therefore not yet been defused.

2. Fatach-Land

The so-called Fatach Land refers to the Arkub region in the Lebanon, which is a triangle bounded by the borders of Israel, Syria and the Lebanon. It extends from Mount Hermon and the Har Dov hill in the east over to the outskirts of the Hatzbani River basin to the west.

Since the establishment of Lebanon, the inhabitants have subsisted on smuggling. From the outset to this very day, the difficult mountainous terrain has weakened the control of the Lebanese central government in this region. Almost every day for many years, convoys that sometimes number hundreds of mules and many tens of smugglers have been wending their way out in the open for all to see, between Syria and the Lebanon via the Hermon mountain. Smuggling has become, with the full consent of the Syrians, the main economic activity in the region. The Syrians can permit the traffic or shut it down at will.

It is therefore understandable that the influence of Syria in the region is greater than that of Lebanon or of Israel. Indeed, the terrorist activity in the Fatach Land reflected the hostile Syrian policy against Israel. Although this region has no refugee camps and absolutely no Palestinian inhabitants, it served as a solid base for hostile acts of terror against us, carried out on the backs of the local population. That was a function of the policy of the Syrians, who were in local conttol.

In 1968, the battles to break through to the Har Dov hill were military operations against the hostile terror organizations.

In 1972, there were hundreds of encounters and terror attacks, in all of which there were involved Syrian-sponsored groups and fighters who were not natives of the region. These incidents also testifed to Syrian local political control.

Since April of 1991, the hostile acts of terrorism in this sector have almost completely ceased.

December of 1993 saw the last attampt to infiltrate, by Fatach Abu Mussa, from the Hatzbani River basin into Kibbutz Dan. Just as the Fatach Land reflected the Syrian policy of hostile terrorism before 1991 in the region, so does it today reflect the new concepts of Syria, based upon her view of the new strategic balance in the Middle East after the Gulf War of 1991.

3. "GRAPES OF WRATH" ; Understandings

The Memoranda of Understanding in the wake of the Israeli military operation named Grapes of Wrath came into effect on April 26,1996. They terminated that military operation, which had begun two weeks before, on April 11. In the course of the fighting, Katyusha rockets were repeatedly launched from Lebanese territory against our northern settlements. In retaliation, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) bombarded the outskirts of villages beyond the Security Zone and the villagers had to flee northwards. Israel intended that these refugees would destabilize Lebanon, disrupt the lives of its citizens, and force their Syrian patrons to reach an agreement that would guarantee the peace of our northern villages.

Grapes of Wrath was a repeat version of Operation Accountability, which opened on July 26 of 1993 and ended a few days later, on August 1. The outcome was a series of verbal understandings between Israel and the Hizbollah, to which both sides later gave
contradictory interpretations. During the fighting, a barrage of artillery shells accidentally exploded amidst a group of refugees in a camp run by the United Nations at the village of Kannah, east of the coastal town of Tzor in the western sector. One hundred and five women and children were killed.

This tragic event created a tremendous political pressure inside Israel to halt the operation. At the same time, world-wide pressure was exerted to quickly reach a settlement. With the mediation of the United States and France, the following document was agreed upon. The original text was in English and the following is a re-translation from the Hebrew version.
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After discussions with the Israeli and Lebanese governments, and in consultation with Syria, the United States understands that Israel and Lebanon shall guarantee the following:

1. Armed groups from Lebanon shall not open fire against Israel with Katyusha rockets or any other weapon.
2. Israel and the bodies with which it collaborates shall not open fire with any weapons whatsoever upon civilians or civilian targets in Lebanon.
3. Furthermore, both sides commit themselves not to allow, under any conditions, civilians to become the targets of attack. Similarly, they shall not use areas populated by civilians and industrial and electrical installations as forward bases for launching attacks.
4. Without violating the items of the aforesaid understandings, no part of them may prevent each party from applying its right to self-defense.

The understandings which have been achieved to put an end to the present crisis between Lebanon and Israel cannot take the place of a permanent solution. The United States understands the importance of the orientation towards a comprehensive peace in the region. To achieve that goal, the United States suggests to resume, at a date to be agreed upon, the negotiations between Israel and Syria, as well as between Israel and Lebanon. The United States understands that it is desirable that these discussions take place in an atmosphere of stability and calm.

The understandings shall be announced simultaneously by all the countries concerned at 18:00 hours on April 26, 1996.

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The advantages of the document are that it was put into writing, was achieved "in consultation with Syria", and was signed by sovereign states with the involvement of super-powers. The document calls for the establishment of a permanent mechanism for supervision, in which representatives of Syria, Israel and Lebanon regularly meet. In substance, the document recognizes the right of Israel to a secure northern border and incidentally recognizes the northern border itself. However, the document holds both sides responsible not to harm civilians. Israel, according to paragraph 4 of the understandings, understands that warfare against the Israeli presence in Lebanon is legitimate, within the framework of "the right to self-defense". It would seem that this document embodies the aspirations of Israel in Lebanon and converts its presence there to superfluous.

4. Hizbollah - Organizational Structure

After a shake-up in the middle of the 1980's, Sheikh Mohammed Chasin Fadlallah stands at the head of the organization. At his side there is a Council of Sages called the Shurah, the size and compostition of which are not exactly known. This body makes political decisions in matters of principle only and does not participate in the ongoing administration of the organization. It therefore convenes only when necessary.

Under the Shurah there functions a general secretary, who at this time is Sheikh Chasin Nasrallah. He is the chairman of an executive committee named the Executive Shurah that runs the organization according to the policies that have been decided by the Shurah.

The members of the Executive Shurah man two committees, one on security and the other political. According to the population centers of Shi'ites in the Lebanon and the number of heads of action-groups, the Executive Shurah controls three extended regions: the Beka'a Valley, the South and Beirut.

One action group is responsible for educational, relief and welfare activities and works through sub-groups. The sub-groups initiate the establishment and operation of hospitals, kindergartens, and schools. They also provide a varied basket of additional social services, such as the treatment of the disabled, help for the families of war victims, and economic assistance.

A military action group controls the fighting formations, the intelligence arm and the security arm of the organization, The military acion group is divided into three levels. The basic level is that of a militia which is composed of several thousand volunteers who function as guards and as observers in their villages. As required, they also fire weapons such as mortars from the outskirts of those villages that are in contact with the Security Zone. They are sometimes sent to specific, technical courses in the villages of the hinterland and are sometimes called up for about one week a year to help hold a line in problematic sectors. The volunteers continue the routines of their civilian lives and enjoy the services of the organization to its members, such as medical care and facilities for education.

Above the basic level, there is a permanent action group composed of several hundred fighters who have undergone organized training, sometimes in Iran. They perform the invasive activities, such as anti-personnel ambushes, anti-tank ambushes, the placement of explosive charges, and attacks against enemy outposts. The permanent military force prepares for an attack in a professional way, including the use of observers to gather intelligence, early planning and dry runs. The permanent force receives full pay and devotes its full time to the organization.

Above the permanent action-group there is a special force of several tens of fighters who have undergone special training, partly in Iran. Each fighter has been trained to learn a specialty, such as sabotage, battlefield intelligence, firing of weapons, sniping and so on.

5. Hizbollah : Political History

The name Hizbollah means "The Party of the Lord". The Hizbollah was established by the Iranians in Lebanon at the close of 1982, in proximity to the Peace for Galilee military operation of Israel. This was at the height of the Homeini revolution, in an attempt to extend the revolution into the Middle East. The move-ment united a number of radical Islamic groups who had been active in the country. Many basic factors served as fertile soil for the growth of the new movement: a large religious Shi'ite popula- tion, deep and justly-felt feelings of discrimination, political anarchy, and direct friction with the enemies of the Iranian revolution, namely, the United States (the Great Satan) and Israel (the Small Satan).

Between 1982 and 1994, activists of the organization carried out many acts of terrorism in the Lebanon and around the world. (Refer to item 6 below about Hizbollah/ A History of Terror). During the 1980's, the leaders of the organization, headed by the secretary at that time, Subchi Tufeili, made repeated declarations that "the direction of the organization is to establish an Islamic Repulic in the entire Middle East". As a corollary to this aim, "the road to Jerusalem passes through South Lebanon". During those years, the organization did not participate in any demo- cratic political process whatsoever within the Lebanon.

In 1989, a violent confrontation broke out between the Hizbollah and its sister Shi'ite movement Amal over the question of who shall lead and represent the community. The fighting took place mainly in the South and in the end the Hizbollah defeated Amal. At that time, the organization began, for the first time, to come into continual contact with the Israeli-controlled Security Zone. This triggered a constant struggle against the Israeli presence in the Lebanon, accompanied by terrorist attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets overseas. (Refer to item 6 below on Hizbollah/ A History of Terror.)

In April of 1992, the IDF liquidated Abbas Mussawi, the Secret-ary General of the Hizbollah. Hassan Nasrallah, who was chosen to replace Mussawi, took over the post at a time when many changes were transforming the face of the Middle East. The Lebanese government, under the terms of the Taif Agreement of 1989, began to tighten its control on the ground and to remove all obstacles that may possibly threaten its sovereignty. Syria, which had been left without the support of the defunct Soviet Union, ceased all support for terrorism, in an effort to restore its standing. At the same time, the Islamic revolutionary fervor had declined, for the sake of economic and political rehabilitation. In the light of these dynamics, Hassan Nasrallah led the Hizbollah towards legitimacy in Lebanese society.

In 1992, the movement participated for the first time in Lebanese electons, albeit on a common platform with Amal. Its represent-
atives reached understandings with the Christians and the Sunni Moslems for the common support of candidates. The leaders of the movement began to speak in terms of "the welfare of the population", "We are all Lebanese" and "respect for national sovereignty".

Leading up to the elections of 1996, the Hizbollah went so far as establish and sponsor an ephemeral organization called "The Lebanese Battalions of Liberation". All the people of Lebanon, regardless of ethnic affiliation, were called upon to mobilize for a war of liberation against the Israeli occupier, since the struggle against a foreign occupier was considered to be legitimate.
From 1995 onwards, the involvement of the Hizbollah in inter-
national terrorism ceased. The organization had accepted the understandings after the Operation Grapes of Wrath, of April,
1996, which forbid all shooting into Israel, but allow a struggle against the occupying power. Most importantly, the Understand-ings recognize the Lebanon-Israel international boundary. (See item 3 above on the Grapes of Wrath Understandings.)

This turning point in the organization led to a violent confront-ation between the supporters the traditional Islamic line, headed by the former Secretary, Subchi Tofeili and the new leadership of Nasrallah. This confrontation split the ranks of the movement.
at the beginning of 1998 (see item 14 below about The Revolution of the Hungry),

During the past few years, the spokesmen of the Hizbollah emphasize their determination to combat Israel until the last foreign soldier is chased out of Lebanon. However, they are foggy about their intentions for the future after that. One may learn about these intentions from the multitude of declarations by the leaders of the Hizbollah about their commitment to the Lebanon, to its status, sovereignty and the peace of its citizens. The Hizbollah has traversed a long road from being a revolutionary, terrorist Pan-Islamic movement from its inception in 1983 to a Shi'ite national movement which seeks its place into a multi-community Lebanon.

6. Hizbollah : A History of Terrorism

The history of terrorism by the Hizbollah may be divided into a number of chronological stages.

STAGE A 1983 TO 1988

One may label this period as Terror Running Wild. The Shi'ite terrorists, inspired by Iran but frequently also through local internal initiatives, attacked anything that they related to the West. The activists of Hizbollah, using various aliases such as The Organization for the Defense of the Liberated or The Struggle for Freedom, abducted and sometimes liquidated Western journalists, academics and diplomats. The victims were not only males and not only Americans but also included citizens of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy India, Korea and Saudia Arabia.

Under the alias of The Islamic Jihad, the organization carried out infernal terror attacks in which hundreds died. On October 23, 1983, they blew up the headquarters of the United States Marines in Beirut, killing over 150 American servicemen. They also bombed the French Embassy in Beirut, killing 73. On November 4, 1983, 29 Israelis were killed in the demolition of an Israeli military building in the town of Tzor, the second catastrophe of its kind. On October 19, 1988, seven more Israeli soldiers were killed when a convoy of senior officers was attacked near Metulla. This is only a partial list of Hizbollah terrorism.

In parallel, under the alias of The Depressed of the Earth, other saboteurs were busy hijacking airplanes and terrorizing the world. One especially calls to mind the hijacking of the TWA flight on June 14, 1985, in the course of which the airplane was shuttled for an entire week from country to country in the Middle East until the hostages were freed and extricated without harm. Among the hijackers were I'mmad Muai'niyeh and Abdul Hadi Chammadi, who had became notorious as international terrorists. During these years, Israel was just another enemy, one among many.

STAGE B: 1988 TO 1991

One may label this period as Creating an Establishment on a Firm Foundation. During these years, the working mechanism of the Hizbollah became consolidated and it established an independent, military force, partly a militia and partly full-time soldiers. A delegation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards had already settled into Lebanon in the middle of the 1980's and they now became active in training, guidance, and planning the operational activities of the organization.

With the aim of openly taking over the leadership of the Shi'ite community in Lebanon, the Hizbollah initiated a military confrontation against its competitors among the Shi'ites, the Amal Movement. (Refer to see item 1 above on the Amal Movement).
The fighting began in 1988 and continued until 1990, when the Hizbollah won a complete victory. In November of 1990, the Hizbollah reached an agreement with Amal which regulates the status of the Hizbollah within the Shi'ite community and the freedom of movement of the activists of each organization within the confines of the other. This agreement was known as Damascus 2 and was achieved, in effect, with the mediation of Syria. For the first time, the Hizbollah ruled areas that were in the proximity of the Security Zone and to the IDF.

STAGE C: 1991 TO 1995

One may label this period as The Struggle Against Zionism. The firm foundations of the central government in Lebanon began to be restored in 1991under the sponsorship of Syria. The aspirations of Beirut to achieve international legitimacy made it unwilling to allow the degradation of Lebanese sovereignty to continue in any way whatsoever. Beirut began to suppress and remove the Palestinian organizations from the power struggles inside Lebanon, and disarmed the militias of the ethnic communities. This channeled the Hizbollah into the only possible direction that was left open, namely, to continue the war against Israel.

The political responsibility of the Hizbollah for the peace of the Shi'ite population and for the sovereignty of Lebanon, motivated it to limit itself to military action on its side of the border only. The firing of Katyusha rockets across the border into Israel served as a strategic deterrent only, in case of casualties inflicted by Israel upon the Lebanese population for which Hizbollah was responsible.

The struggle against the Zionist Entity was shifted to institutions overseas. On March 17 of 1992, twenty two persons died in a terror attack on the Israel Embassy in Argentina. On July 18 of 1994, about eighty persons died when the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires was blown up. On July 26 of 1994, an attack on the Israel Embassy in Britain did not succeed. However, there were smaller attacks against Jewish institutions around the world, including failed attempts against targets in Thailand and in Jerusalem. These hostile acts were an expression of the war of the Hizbollah not only against Israel but also against the Zionist movement.

STAGE D: 1995 TO 1999

One may label this period as National Liberation. In the wake of the political changes and the turnabout that the Hizbollah had made in its orientation towards Lebanese society, the organization began to present itself as a movement for national liberation against the foreign occupying power. (Refer to the item above on Hizbollah/ Political History). In the field, the struggle against Israel is now confined to confronting the presence of Israel in the Security Zone. The focus is upon the typical operations of a war of attrition, such as laying explosive charges, carrying out televised attacks on enemy outposts (in which the Hizbollah flag is raised before the attackers withdraw), assassinating senior IDF and SLA officers, such as the murder on March 1, 1999, of IDF Brigadier General Erez Gerstein, of blessed memory. Attacks against Israel are conceived to be a strategic deterrent against our own attacks against Lebanese civilians. The Hizbollah organization, that began its activities with global terror against all the enemies of Shi'ite Islam in the world, has gradually narrowed its objectives and range of action to a war of liberation against the Israeli presence in Lebanon.

7. Iran : Policy Towards Lebanon

The policy of Iran towards Lebanon is based on the fact that Iran has no political, economic or security interests in Lebanon. By tradition, Iran has guided its policy in Lebanon within the context of its relations with the Arab states and the needs of Iranian diplomacy.

In 1978, the revolution of Homeini in Iran brought with it a burning enthusiasm, mainly Shi'ite, and a concept of Jihad against the West. Against this background, the Shi'ite community in Lebanon became very important in the promotion of revolution and struggle. The policies of Iran may be divided into two stages.

STAGE A: 1982 to 1991

This period may be labeled as The Grand Confrontation, in which Iran viewed the Lebanon as a part of the Pan-Islamic Republic which would arise in the Middle East. To achieve that goal, Lebanon would be a forward base of the revolution. Some members of the Shi'ite community, with the Hizbollah in the forefront, placed themselves at the disposal of the Jihad and the struggle of Iran against the United States, Israel and the West. A large military delegation of the so-called Revolutionary Guards from Iran was stationed in the Lebanon. The Embassy of Iran in Beirut served as the general headquarters of the Hizbollah. In matters of politics, religion, ideology and security, the Shi'ite community was functioning as an extension of Iran.

STAGE 2: 1991 to 1999
One may label this period as A Return to Normalcy. Since the Gulf War, the revolutionary fervor in Iran has been declining and with it the interest of Iran in the Lebanon. In recent years, Iran has been searching for ties and bridges to the West and has ceased all support for international terrorism. In 1997, the last of the Revolutionary Guards left Lebanese soil and a relatively moderate president named Hatemi was elected. The assistance from Iran has tended to decrease and Iran has even expressed an understanding of the peace process between Syria and Israel.

In March of 1998, the Hizbollah split up between the supporters of Islamic revolutionary orthodoxy, led by Subchi Tofeili, and the supporters of the Lebanese national orientation, led by Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah. Iran gave its unequivocal support to the latter, thus assenting to the independent policies of the Hizbollah.
(Refer to the part 14 below on The Revolution of the Hungry.)

The policy of Iran in the Lebanon has always been a product of its revolutionary concepts. Although the process of the return to normalcy and to the community of enlightened nations is not stable and suffers from setbacks, the trend is clear. Iran will neither view the Shi'ites in the Lebanon as an arm of the Iranian revolution nor act as a sponsor of the Hizbollah organization. Hence the influence of Iran in the Lebanon is rapidly weakening.

8. Israel : Policy Towards Lebanon

The policy of Israel towards Lebanon has almost always been based upon two principles. First, the recognition of the international boundary between the two countries. Second, a constant striving to achieve security for the Jewish settlements along the border. From 1969 onwards, Israel has been activating ever-increasing forces as the authority and sovereignty of Beirut deteriorates in the south. Israel therefore had a constant interest, whenever possible, in supporting a stable and strong central government in Lebanon that would be capable of bearing political responsibility for the south. In June of 1982, the military operation named Peace for the Galilee represented a deviation from the fixed policy of Israel in the Lebanon.

In Israeli government circles, there developed an outlook that it is possible to exploit the anarchy in Lebanon and the weakness of the Syrians in order to bring about out a strategic reversal of the status of Israel in the Middle East. By assisting the Christians to renew their hold on the institutions of political power in Lebanon, Israel expected to achieve several goals. By driving out once and for all the Palestinian groups from Lebanese territory, the security of our northern settlements would be guaranteed and any possible threat to the stability of Lebanon thwarted. By driving the Syrian Army out from the Bek'aa Valley, Israel would create a threat to the Syrian hinterland. (Refer to item 19 below on Syria and its Policy Towards Lebanon.) In effect, this would have converted the defensive setup of the Syrians on the Golan Heights to irrelevant and force Syria to compromise with Israel in Lebanon and at the same time surrendering the Golan Heights. Another goal was to sign a peace treaty with Lebanon which would represent all the other achievements.

As is well known, Israel failed to execute this plan and retreated to a security zone in 1985, announcing a return to its traditional policies. Since 1991, the central government in Lebanon has become ever stronger and the Palestinian threat has been eliminated. The warfare within Lebanon has assumed the character of national liberation from foreign occupation and the Memorandum of Understandings was signed after the Israeli operation Grapes of Wrath. (Refer to item 3 above, on the Grapes of Wrath Understandings.) The pros and cons of the continuation of the presence of the IDF in Lebanon focus around the degree of sovereignty, stability and political responsibility of Syria in Lebanon. However, under the surface and in deviation from Israel's permanent declared policies, there are bodies which see the presence of Israel in Lebanon as an a lever in the strategic negotiations with Syria. If this is correct, then Israel could be returning, although on a much smaller scale, to its basic error of 1982.

9. Jezzine Enclave

The village of Jezzine is located about 35 kilimeters north of Metulla and about 17 kilometers east of Sidon. It is on the western slopes of the Jebel Baruch mountain, on the tributaries of the Awali River. Jezzine had been a center of tourism and recreation for the wealthy Christians of Lebanon and many of its natives serve in senior positions of the government.

Between 1976 and 1982, the Syrians ruled the village, by agreement with Israel, which enabled Syrian intervention on behalf of the Christians in Lebanon. As of 1985, the area of the enclave was about 110 square kilometers and included a number of other villages. Its population numbered about 15,000 inhabitants plus about 35,000 refugees who had fled before the terror of the Druze militiamen who had taken control of the district.

When the IDF evacuated the region in 1984, several bodies began to protect the population. There was a Christian force, which in time became a regiment of the South Lebanese Army (SLA), in collaboration with a company of Christian soldiers of the Lebanese Army. The location of the village, the size of its Christian population, its economic assets and the forces defending them all combined to move General Lachad to demand control of this enclave as a condition for his consent to command the SLA.

In his response of April 4, 1985, the Minister of Defense agreed to equip, train and finance this force under the control of the General, but not within the confines of the Security Zone. In order to ensure territorial integrity, the Security Zone was extended to 25 kilometers from Metulla, to the outskirts of the enclave. This created an involuntary linkage between Israel and the Jezzine enclave.

The restoration of the central government in Lebanon, which had begun in 1991 under the sponsorship of Syria, enabled the refugees to return home. The collaboration between the SLA and the company of Lebanese Army was stopped. The fighting in the area and the detachment of the enclave from the rest of Lebanon brought about an economic deterioration, abandonment by the population, and a continuous tension between the SLA and the inhabitants, who began to collaborate with the central government and with Lebanese Intelligence.

In the absence of an IDF umbrella, the soldiers of the SLA became more vulnerable and they also began to abandon the enclave. A company of SLA soldiers which had numbered 650 men in 1985 declined to 210 men in early 1999. The area of the enclave was gradually reduced to about 15 square kilometers. When the enclave collapsed on June 1 of 1999, only 3,500 inhabitants had remained Considering all these, Jezzine had for some time ceased being an asset and had become a burden instead.



10. Lached, General Antoine

General Antoine Lachad was born in the Mattan Mountains in 1925 and is now 74 years old. He chose a military career and served as the Chief of Lebanese Military Intelligence in 1984. He is regarded as a Christian nationalist and a firm opponent of the Syrian presence in Lebanon. When he was defeated in his struggle to be appointed Chief of General Staff in 1984, he accepted a proposal to take over the command of the South Lebanese Army (SLA), but on condition that he retain control the district of Jezzine. (Refer to item 9 above on the Jezzine Enclave.)

In 1991, the central government of Lebanon was restored under the sponsorship of Syria. The SLA had became a mainly Shi'ite force. It would seem that these developments have dashed his hopes to push the Syrians out with the aid of Israel, and attain an independent status in a Christian Lebanon. In practice, he no longer commands the SLA and the force is activated directly by the IDF. There are increasing signs that he is seeking a way to safely retire to a political haven in France. Nowadays he serves as an advisor and instills a measure of legitimacy to the presence of Israel in South Lebanon. There is no doubt that the retirement of General Antoine Lachad would provoke a grave crisis in South Lebanon.



11. Lebanon Liaison Unit

The Lebanon Liaison Unit (LLU) was set up when the Security Zone was established in 1985. It was based upon the mechanism for coordination in the South Lebanese Region (then the SLR), as it took shape between 1978 and 1982 under Major Sa'ad Haddad and Sami Shidiak. (Refer to item 16 below on the Security Zone.)

The mission of the unit was to train and equip the South Lebanese Army (SLA), to care for the population of South Lebanon, to coordinate between the SLA and the IDF, and to develop contacts with the powers that be in Lebanon. For these purposes, the Intelligence Arm of the LLU has been relatively well developed. No direct operational responsibility was placed upon the LLU.

As early as 1978, the role of liaison in Lebanon was assigned to senior intelligence officers who were skilled at understanding the forces at work in the country, especially regarding the tendency of the Lebanese to maneuver others, including the IDF, for their own needs. These officers became experts at exploiting the tensions among the ethnic groups of the population, more than developing the operational fitness of the SLA itself.

From 1987 onward, when Brigadier David Agmon replaced Brigadier Danny Rothschild of the Military Intelligence Branch, the command over the LLU became a stepping stone for the promotion of superior brigade commanders from outstanding infantry units. From the nature of things, these officers focused more upon the SLA itself than upon other areas. They demanded, and in the course of time received, responsibility for military operations.

Yet there were several factors to be considered. Although the operational qualifications of the SLA had improved somewhat, they still remained low. Furthermore, the traditional tendency of the Christian command in the SLA was to maneuver the IDF and shy away from responsibility. As a result, the operational requirements of the IDF officers eventually led to increased IDF involvement, beyond what was required only to back and support the SLA.

Nowadays, the emphasis of the LLU has been shifted to operational command, at the expense of its traditional missions to assist and to be a mentor. For example, there is a framework of an exclusive sector of responsibility, especially the sector of Aishiyeh-Reichan, where a relatively large IDF force still guards the road to Jezzine which had already fallen. (Refer to part 9 above on the Jezzine Enclave).

In addition to its regular military missions, the LLU has a branch for assistance to civilians, a system for the control of the border crossings into northern Lebanon through the so-called Red Line, as well as the border crossings southwards into Israel through the so-called Violet Line. The LLU also has a coordination branch for internal security, a radio station and communications groups. (Refer to item 13 below on the Red Line and to item 21 below on the Violet Line).



12. Palestinians - Organizations In Lebanon

Among the Palestinian organizations in the Lebanon, some supported the Fatach and Yasser Arafat, while others were pro-Syrian and rejected the leadership of the Fatach. The military operation of Peace in Galilee led to the removal of the Fatach followers from Lebanon.

With the establishment of the Security Zone in 1985, almost all the Palestinian activity in Lebanon was in the hands of the pro-Syrian groups, such as Fatach Abu-Mussa and the various Democratic Front movements. Their hostile acts of terror were guided and assisted by the infrastructure of Syrian Intelligence in Lebanon.

Since that time, however, the picture has changed. The Taif Agreement went into effect, the sovereignty of the central government in Beirut was restored, the Soviet Union collapsed and Damascus strengthened its ties with the United States. (Refer to item 19 below, on the policies of Syria towards Lebanon.)

These changes motivated Syria to cease all support for hostile acts of terror by those organizations whose very activities in Lebanon were threatening the sovereignty of the country. December of 1993 saw the last attempt of any Palestinian organization to mount a raid from the Lebanon, after their activities had already been declining almost completely. (Refer to item 2 above, on the Fatach Land.)

In 1988, by comparison, twelve Palestinian raiding parties, all members of pro-Syrian groups, had penetrated the border fence between Lebanon and Israel. Forty-eight other raiding parties were intercepted in the Security Zone en route to hit at Israel.

As of today, in 1999, the Palestinian headquarters are concentrated in Damasxus, under Syrian supervision and devoid of activity. Individual activists still function in Lebanon in fly-by-night organizations under supervision of the Lebanese Army. They have no practical influence in the field at all and their energy is directed into internal disputes and power struggles between criminals. In effect, the Palestinians have ceased to be a threat to our northern frontier.



13. Red Line

This is a line on the map that marks the northern boundary of the Security Zone. It winds its way for about 130 kilometers from the folds of Mount Hermon in the northeast to the Mediterranean Sea in the southwest.

The Red Line was drawn along the contours of the terrain to make it difficult for raiding parties of terrorists to penetrate and perpetrate hostile attacks. It was also designed to guarantee the integrity of the route to the enclave of Jezzine. (Refer to item 9 above on the Jezzine Enclave.) Another consideration was to include within the demarcation line a sympathetic population, such as the Druze in the Hatzbaya region in the east.

In practice, the line marks the boundary of the area in which the government of Israel has given permission to the IDF to operate, as well as to assist and support the South Lebanese Army (SLA), without the approval of each action by the Cabinet, as is required whenever the IDF is sent into action outside the borders of the State. In fact, even within the boundaries of the Red Line, there are ever-increasing areas and regions in which the IDF and the SLA have abandoned all military activity.



14. Revolution of the Hungry

The great crisis in the Hizbollah began in the autumn of 1997. Subchi Tofeili, the first General Secretary, had begun to preach, from his home village near Baalbek in the Bek'aa Valley, against the current leadership of Hizbollah under Nasrallah. Tofeili claimed that the Hizbollah had abandoned its commitments to welfare and to social service, which are basic elements in all Islamic movements.

He therefore founded a new movement and named it The Revolution of the Hungry. Tofeili claimed that any future neglect of social issues would lead to the decline of the organization and accused the Hizbollah of neglecting to care about repairing the damage done by Operation Grapes of Wrath.

In effect, Tofeili was rebelling against the about-face in the policies of the Hizbollah. It had turned into a Lebanese national parliamentary movement, at the expense of its pan-Islamic image. It had adopted practical politics as opposed to ideological fervor. (Refer to the item 5 above on the political history of the Hizbollah.)

Around Tofeili there gathered many Hizbollah veterans who began to pose a threat not only to the Hizbollah but also to the stability throughout Lebanon, because of their pan-Islamic concepts and their record of revolution and terror. The Revolution of the Hungry created above all a dilemma for the Iranians. On the one hand, they could support Nasrallah and his practical line, oriented upon the Lebanon, which would slowly but surely lead to independence from Iran. On the other hand, they could support their old-time ally who had continued to advocate a pan-Islamic revolution in the Middle East. In the end, Iran decided in favor of Nasrallah. (Refer to item 7 above on the policies of Iran towards Lebanon.)

At the end of March in 1998, the Lebanese Army, assisted by Syria and the Hizbollah, laid siege upon the supporters of Subchi Tofeili in the Baalbek region. The besiegers disarmed their opponents, allowed their leaders to flee into the mountains and detained the followers. The importance of the Revolution of the Hungry lies in the clear-cut fateful decisions made by Iran, the Hizbollah, Lebanon and Syria, that is, to put an end to the uncontrolled fanaticism of zealots and prevent any further threats to the stability of Lebanon.



15. Security Council Resolution 425

This resolution was adopted on March 19, 1978, after Operation Litani, in which the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had taken control of most of the territories south of the Litani River in the Lebanon. The objective of the operation was to prevent terror attacks against the inhabitants of northern Israel, in the face of the cruel civil war in Lebanon which was creating anarchy and tearing the country apart. The following is a close facsimile of the original text of that resolution.

Facsimile of Security Council Resolution 425

This resolution has been adopted by the Security Council in Session number 2074, on the nineteenth of March, 1978. The Security Council has taken note of the letters of the permanent representatives of Lebanon and Israel. Listening to the declarations of these permanent representatives caused us great concern about the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and its implications for the preservation of world peace.

1. We call for a strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of Lebanon within its recognized international borders.
2. We call upon Israel to cease and desist from its military activity against the territorial integrity of the Lebanon and to withdraw its forces from all parts of Lebanese territory.
3. We have decided, in accession to a request from the Lebanese Government, to immediately establish a provisional force for South Lebanon under the authority of the United Nations. Its objective shall be to ensure the withdrawal of the Israeli forces, to restore international peace and security, and to assist the Lebanese government to ensure an effective return of its authority to the region. The force shall be composed of a staff that shall be appointed by the member nations.
4. We demand that the General Secretary report to the Security Council within 24 hours about the execution of the present resolution.

1. Since 1990, only one superpower remains in the world, which limits the ability of the Syrians to maneuver between superpowers.
2. Since the Gulf War of 1991, the central objective of Syrian policy has been to cut off state support for international terrorism in order to prompt the United States to remove Syria from its blacklist of terrorist states.
3. With the sponsorship and backing of Syria, Lebanon has shifted from a state of anarchy to an authoritative centralized regime.
4. Syria has shifted from a limited involvement in the affairs of Lebanon, as prescribed by the Red Line of 1976, to full control of Lebanon, which is recognized de facto by the international community.
5. Lebanese society, including the Hizbollah since 1992, is in transition from a nationalism oriented on sects and ethnic groups to a nationalism which is pan-Lebanese, supra-ethnic and committed to the peaceful development of the population.
6. The situation of the absence of all responsibility and political infrastructure for the security of our northern settlements is changing. The movement is towards an internationally-backed political arrangement with the participation of Syria, which recognizes the right of Israel to security on its northern border, as well as the right of the Lebanese to resist Israel by force within Lebanon. This latter right is anchored in the phrase "the right to resist a foreign occupier" in the Understandings after Grapes of Wrath in April of 1996.
7. Especially since the election of Hatemi as its president in 1997, Iran has changed from an inward-looking, extremist Islamic state to one that is seeking openness to the West and economic links with it. In accordance, Iran has ceased all support for international terrorism by the Hizbollah.
8. Our enemies used to be the Palestinians, who were also the enemies of the inhabitants of South Lebanon. Now our enemies are the Hizbollah, who are the ethnic kinfolks of most of the people of the south, share their religion and enjoy their sympathies.
9. The Hizbollah has changed from an international Islamic terror organization to a Lebanese political organization. According to its declarations, it is committed, to the political interests of Lebanon, as defined by the Lebanese Parliament, especially since 1992, when it began to participate in Lebanese elections.
10. The threat has changed from the penetration into Israel of Palestinian raiding parties to cross-border fire (Katyusha rockets) which endangers a wide population. The Security Zone does not address this threat at all.
11. The IDF is no longer a friendly, helpful force but has become an oppressive army of occupation.