Who wants to be a billionaire?

Zvi Barel, Ha'aretz, 6.9.00

On Monday, Solidar stocks traded on the London Stock Exchange soared by nearly 12 percent. Solidar is Lebanon's largest construction company and is owned by Rafik Hariri, the man whose party has emerged victorious in the current Lebanese parliamentary elections. The Lebanese lira strengthened against the dollar and Beirut real estate dealers reported feverish buying on the same day as the unofficial results of the elections were known, indicating a sweeping victory for Hariri's list.

Two years after leaving the prime minister's office, Hariri will return. He will also return to the economic activity that made Lebanon attractive to foreign investors. When the new parliament is sworn in on October 17, barring any surprises, Hariri will be elected prime minister and become the crucial figure in the troika that has run Lebanon since the 1989 signing of the Taif agreement, which redistributed the balance of power in Lebanon among its ethnic groups. Facing him will be the Parliament speaker, Nabih Berri, who, together with the Hezbollah and Amal lists, also won by a large majority. Above them all is President Emile Lahoud, the man who prompted Hariri's 1998 resignation.

The 56-year-old Hariri, a billionaire who made his fortune in construction work in Saudi Arabia, will now have less time to spend in the luxurious villa he built in the Fakra neighborhood outside Beirut. Presumably, he will also have to cut back on the trips in his two private jets, although during his previous tenure as prime minister he registered no less than 100 days of foreign travel. He will again be escorted by more than 40 bodyguards and a convoy of six of his own Mercedes cars, which will make his every appearance into an event, except that once more the cost of the gasoline will be covered by the Lebanese taxpayer.

It seems there is a lot of truth in the claim of history professor and outgoing prime minister, Salim Hoss, who said in his speech conceding defeat that money had determined the election result. Hoss did not mention Hariri by name. He didn't need to - everyone knew whose money he was referring to. According to Lebanese reports, Hariri invested over $3 million in the first round of elections and nearly double that in the second round.

Deep recession

However, it wasn't only Hariri's personal wealth that played a decisive role in these elections. Lebanon's economic situation is what really swayed the balance. Promises made by the Hoss government to build a new economy, promote development and prosperity, extract Lebanon from its monetary crisis and create equal opportunities for all citizens for the most part remained on paper. The huge project to franchise cellular phone companies, which will eventually bring in around $2 billion to the country, was run in an amateurish way and has so far caused huge losses for the state.

Real estate deals went into a deep recession and luxury apartments hardly sold; housing for impoverished families was not built and some 90,000 housing units, for which there was a demand, did not get past the planning stage. Infrastructure development begun by Hariri was halted nearly all at once, and strikes and demonstrations calling for the improvement of the economic situation were a feature throughout most of term of the outgoing government. It seemed like the country was holding the wake before the actual death had occurred. The fact that Hariri was the one who entangled the country in its large foreign debt paled in comparison to the disappointment in the Hoss government.

"These are, first of all, pro-Lebanese and not anti-Syrian elections," clarifies a Lebanese journalist based in Washington. "True, there was massive Syrian involvement here and it seems that Syria nevertheless wants to maintain the current political structure, which it created. But you have to remember that Hariri was also Syria's man and he'll continue to operate in their shadow."

Still, a look at the order of events shows that even if these elections sparked a political upset, it was not a diplomatic turning point. In 1989, after the signing of the Taif agreement which ended the civil war, Syria appointed Elias Hrawi as president and Salim Hoss as prime minister. Hoss in turn appointed Emile Lahoud as chief of staff. Then came the 1992 elections: Hariri won and, with Syria's blessing, was appointed prime minister. He immediately acquired two enemies: President Hrawi and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri. During his six years in office, sometimes months went by when the prime minister did not talk to the president or the Speaker; Syria managed its interests in Lebanon as it wished and when it decided that the tiff between the three should end, it simply said so.

When Hrawi's term ended and Syria signaled its desire to appoint Chief of Staff Emile Lahoud as president, Hariri was furious. He felt that in terms of Lebanese domestic politics, it would be undesirable to have a president with such an influential army position, even though Lahoud resigned as chief of staff before his appointment as president. Hariri, who feared that such a strong Christian might detract from his authority as the Muslim prime minister, clarified his position to the Syrians, but announced that he would work with whichever president was appointed.

Syria's indifference

Lahoud felt the same way about Hariri. Lahoud as president did not have the same authority as the prime minister but in the internal political game, he did have some influence. From the start, it was clear that an alliance between Lahoud and Hariri would not happen and Lahoud began political maneuvering to get rid of him. According to the constitution, the president cannot appoint the prime minister or cabinet without consulting with the members of Parliament. Before he appointed the prime minister in 1998, Lahoud announced that 80 of the Parliament members had informed him of their support for Hariri's appointment, but more than 30 had left it up to him to decide.

Hariri swung into action. He realized that Lahoud might assume illegal powers based on the fact that some Parliament members had chosen not to take a position. Although it was not the entire Parliament (which has 128 members), Hariri feared that one day a majority would transfer their constitutional authority to the president and upset the existing balance between the Parliament and the presidency, a balance reflecting the distribution of ethnic populations in Lebanon.

In such a situation, Hariri felt the country might again deteriorate into civil war and lead to a period in which the Christian president crushed the Muslims. Hariri waged his most important battle against the Lebanese president and lost. Syria did not intervene, it let Lahoud appoint Salim Hoss, his close associate, as prime minister and quickly accepted Hariri's resignation.

Syria's indifference to the change in power can firstly be explained by the fact that Beirut's suggested alternative at the time was not a cause for concern. In the system of balances that neutralized the different factions, Syria still controlled the speaker of Parliament, who has always been pro-Syrian, it had appointed the president, and Hoss, the prime minister-designate, was not a charismatic figure who could create a dispute between Lebanon and Syria. Furthermore, Hariri posed a complex dilemma for Syria during his tenure. His strong financial capability, contacts with foreign investors and the huge economic development which he brought to Lebanon also were of substantial benefit to Syria. Over 1 million Syrian workers found work in Hariri's projects and as a result, a great deal of money was sent from Lebanon to Syria. Hariri was perceived as a landlord who also paid the rent.

However, Hariri's economic policy substantially widened the gap between the rich and the poor in Lebanon and prompted some grumbling about government policy. Syria, constantly striving for a harmonious Lebanon devoid of ethnic or class friction, saw the danger in a government whose economic policy created unrest among the Lebanese public. It wanted a more moderate, more socialist government and therefore opted for the comfortable arrangement of Hoss and Nabih Berri, the advocate of social issues.

Now Syria will have a new-old troika, not essentially different from the troika during Hariri's previous term, just as the opposition is not. It even seems as if Hariri's victory comes at a good time, in which Lebanon and Syria need leverage to pull Lebanon out of its recession and renew its economic growth. Syria can assume that if the economic situation does indeed improve, its continued control of Lebanon will not elicit much opposition, which had started to be heard on the eve of the elections. Hariri also will not dismantle the political partnership with Syria nor will he act unilaterally to make peace with Israel.

Bashar Assad's Syria sees Lebanon not only as an economic home front, but also as an economic partner. Therefore it is interested in promoting its economy and, as Hariri can contribute a lot to that, Syria will not hinder him in this respect. The important question now is to what extent will Hariri succeed in functioning opposite the powerful Parliament speaker, Nabih Berri, and the president, Emile Lahoud, and pass the laws he needs to make Lebanon into a free-market economy able to compete in the global economy