Ha’aretz, 19.6.01
The redeployment of Syrian forces in Lebanon indicates an important
change in the relations between Damascus and Beirut. The nature of this change
will be put to the test in the coming weeks. There is no dispute over the fact
that the decision to redeploy the Syrian forces was influenced by Lebanese
public opinion which no longer seems to regard the presence of the Syrian
military in Lebanese cities as strategically valuable.
Lebanon relies on the 1989 Taif agreement that called,
among other things, for Syrian forces to redeploy in the Bekaa Valley within
two years of the signing of the agreement. Twelve years have passed since that signing
and Syria continued to justify its military presence by a need to defend
Lebanon against Israel, but mostly with the real need to prevent a renewed
outbreak of civil war. So long as Israel's occupation of Lebanon continued, the
Lebanese leadership found it difficult to present a unified stance which would
lead to the withdrawal of the Syrian forces that were regarded as defenders of
the country.
The significant change came with the withdrawal of the IDF from southern
Lebanon 13 months ago and with the coming of Bashar Assad to power in Damascus.
The Christian leadership in Lebanon viewed these two developments as an
opportunity to press its case against Syria that the occupation of one Arab
country by another must simply cease. Assad at first rejected the demands of
the Christian Lebanese, but when the leader of the Druze in Lebanon, Walid
Jumblat, joined his Christian compatriots in their demand on Damascus, Assad
understood that postponing a decision on the issue may harm, not only relations
between Syria and Lebanon, but also relations among Lebanese leaders.
The economic boom spurred by Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon, and the
new mood that has taken over the Lebanese public - the war is over and it's now
possible to live again in southern Lebanon - have created a climate in which
Lebanese no longer accept quietly the blatant presence of Syrian troops in the
cities and on the streets. Hezbollah operations in the area around the Shaba
Farms, and Syrian support for them, stirred even Prime Minister Rafik Hariri,
who sees his role as revamping Lebanon's economy, to publicly oppose the
Hezbollah attacks - and indirectly also the policy of Damascus.
Assad was forced into considering how to retain internal Lebanese
harmony, while enabling him to continue steering Lebanese foreign policy
without causing a rift in relations. The astute decision, to withdraw and
redeploy troops, may at least in part and for a time provide an answer to his
dilemma. However, Syria's decision also has two important implications for
Israel. The first is that Hezbollah must understand that domestic Lebanese
politics are no less important to Damascus than its external policy toward
Israel. Hence, there is a significant hint at the degree to which the
organization is now free to operate in Lebanon. The second is that in the
decision there lies an implicit declaration that the Lebanese army is taking
upon itself responsibility for the internal security of the country.
Therefore, the demand should be issued anew to the Lebanese government
to exercise its authority and deploy its army along the border with Israel.
Such a step would mean that Lebanon would exercise its national sovereignty
over all its territory. This in turn would be a further guarantee of quiet
along the border with Israel and of preventing dangerous incidents from
erupting that could cause the new peaceful life in the north to collapse