Keep calm on the northern border

Ha'aretz, 31.10.00

The northern border, which had been relatively quiet since the Israel Defense Forces withdrew from southern Lebanon last May, has been troubled again in recent weeks. The nearly daily stone-throwing routine at Fatma Gate and other points of friction along the border was disrupted by the Hezbollah's kidnapping of three IDF combat engineers three weeks ago. This was followed by the kidnapping of an Israeli citizen, by an attempt by a group of Palestinian guerrillas to penetrate Israel, and increasingly worrisome signs that a renewed series of attacks is imminent.

In his decision to pull the IDF out of the security zone in southern Lebanon without a political agreement safeguarding the northern border, and with the collapse of the South Lebanon Army, Prime Minister Ehud Barak was hoping that peace would be brought to the Galilee. This hope was based on the assumption that the Hezbollah would cease its war against Israel following the withdrawal because it would no longer hold on to the claim that its actions were aimed at an occupying army. It was also believed that as a result of the withdrawal Hezbollah would concentrate on strengthening its political base inside Lebanon.

Israel sought to comply with international guidelines and receive the United Nation's confirmation that it had fulfilled the withdrawal requirements dictated in Security Council resolution 425, even when this meant giving up positions topographically better suited for defense because they were situated several meters inside Lebanon.

Barak backed Israel's adherence to the UN resolutions by warning that any attack on Israel following the withdrawal would trigger harsh reprisals. His warnings were viewed by the other side as credible; many in Israel believed, for several months, that the right mix of efficient deterrence and international recognition was achieved.

The Israeli hopes began to fade with the outbreak of the violence in the territories. Israel's priorities were altered by the situation: No longer did it maintain its ominous warnings on the northern front, but sought to prevent the violent confrontation in the territories from spilling over into the rest of the Arab world.

Trying to avoid a broader conflagration, Barak showed restraint, knowing full well that one of the Hezbollah's aims was to drag the region into a general war. This same consideration remains a priority as the second month of violence begins. However, there is a growing sense that Israel's restraint is bolstering the Hezbollah's resolve. The more attacks take place, the greater the chances that Israel may fall in the Hezbollah trap.

Theoretically, the initiative is with the other side. If the Hezbollah wishes, it will initiate kidnappings, shooting incidents and attempts to penetrate the border, and if it so desires it will limit its activities to demonstrations by protesters at the fence. Israel's ability to influence the course of events, or control the price it may pay for the attacks, seems limited.

In order to avoid a destructive chain of events in the future, it is necessary to embark on diplomatic efforts with those who can influence the Hezbollah, mainly Syrian President Bashar Assad, who is not showing the caution which characterized his late father's policies. Israel needs to act through any available source, and at the highest levels, in order to clarify to Assad the serious implications of the Hezbollah's continued operations. Leaders such as Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and King Abdullah of Jordan, who have an interest in maintaining stability in the region, and of course the U.S. President and the European Union, are essential to this effort.