The price of security

Haaretz, 7.9.00

On the eve of his departure for New York, Prime Minister and Defense Minister Ehud Barak decided to accept the position of the Finance Ministry in the dispute over the defense budget.

In a short meeting at Ben-Gurion International Airport, Barak gave Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz a table depicting the changes in the draft budget. Barak's behavior, in terms of both its style and its substance, angered the chief of staff. Mofaz, who had expected Barak to uphold an earlier promise to increase the defense budget, found himself having to accept a reduction in the amount of shekels that will be made available to the IDF next year and, by implication, in the years to follow as well.

Underlying the dispute is the question of how much can be subtracted from the defense budget in the wake of the Israel Defense Forces' withdrawal from Lebanon. (The IDF received about NIS 1 billion a year to cover its operations in Lebanon.)

According to the IDF's calculations, instead of an addition of NIS 688 million, which it requested for 2001 to meet ongoing and long-term needs, NIS 788 million has been cut from the defense budget. It follows that almost NIS 4 billion will be slashed from the IDF's five-year plan. This is not a debate over economic margins; it means that Israel is willing to invest a lot less in the military might it needs.

The dispute is over two worldviews. The approach of the General Staff and the Defense Ministry holds that it is essential to cost the missions that the political establishment imposes on the army and to act to implement them. In other words, if the government adopts strategic and operational appraisals that constitute a certain response to threats and risks and determines the pace of military build-up and activity, the budgetary implications of such a program cannot be evaded.

The other conception, which is represented by the treasury and the government sector - made up of politicians and civil servants who are committed to civil goals, holds that the army must operate within the budgetary frameworks that stem from the economic situation and must provide maximum security even in the face of financial constraints. The IDF must cope with shortfalls in resources by streamlining its methods.

When he was chief of staff, Barak also acted according to the IDF's traditional perception and demanded that the government increase the defense establishment's slice of the gross national product on the basis of a permanent rate, linked to the rate of economic growth.

The move from the chief of staff's office to the office of the prime minister changed Barak's point of view. Now he is a statesman, responsible not only for additional aspects of national security (the peace process, ties with the U.S. administration, etc.), but also for the state of the economy and the needs of society. As prime minister, Barak will have to go through the upcoming ordeal of getting the budget approved by the Knesset. Without first demonstrating that he is determined to slash the biggest of the budgets, the defense budget, he would have a hard time convincing the other ministers to accept cuts in their areas of responsibility.

In the short term, it is difficult to see how the existing budgetary framework will cause concrete damage to defense; one can hope that organizational reforms will allow some of the required resources to be shifted to the spheres of long-term development and the building up of force.

However, if the chief of staff takes a different view and no longer considers himself able to take responsibility for the IDF, given the existing financial resources at his disposal, he must resign and not make do with directing vague criticism at the level above him.