The United Nations has in its possession numerous, and sometimes
peculiar, documents whose purpose is to prove that the Shaba Farms are indeed
Lebanese, and not Syrian.
These documents include building permits issued to contractors via the Lebanese authorities, sheepherding licenses issued to Lebanese shepherds, kushans (land ownership certificates) in the name of Lebanese entrepreneurs, plus hundreds more documents which, the Lebanese government hopes, will show that the area is indeed under its control.
But one document is still missing: an official, legal certificate
signed by the Syrian government declaring that it waives its ownership of the
area.
The UN is not prepared to make do with the public declarations by Syria
that the area is Lebanese. Israel conquered the land from Syria; it appears as
Syrian territory on UN maps and so, says the UN, the area is Syrian.
Two weeks ago, Bashar Assad received further proof that there is no
need for any document to testify to the "Syrianess" of the Shaba
Farms.
The IAF's bombardment of a Syrian radar station in Dir El-Beider in
response to a Hezbollah attack on Har Dov in which Sergeant Elad Litvak was
killed, brought the goings on in Shaba right to Assad's door.
From that precise moment, Hezbollah's future response was rendered
irrelevant. Assad, rather than Hezbollah, was the one expected to respond, and
he admitted last week in an interview to the Spanish daily El Pais that Syria's
response would not be a military one, so as not to play into Sharon's hands.
This, however, is only half an answer. Assad in fact, cannot leave it
to Hezbollah to respond on his behalf, since the guerrilla organization, at
least according to Assad, does not take its orders from Syria and is not
fighting Syria's war in Lebanon.
The installation destroyed was a Syrian one, and a response by Hezbollah on
Syria's behalf would mean that Syria's claims that its forces in Lebanon are
there for the good of Lebanon are hollow ones. Moreover, Assad backs
Hezbollah's activities against Israel on the condition that it not undermine
the harmony he so aspires to in his relations with Lebanon.
Thus, even if Syria had the military capacity to cope with the
repercussions of an attack against Israel, the above political reasons are
enough to halt such an attack.
The political and military embarrassment that the Shaba Farms cause
Syria is no less great than the headache it causes Israel.
If there is any strategic significance to control of the area, it is
canceled out by the dangerous possibility that it will become a pretext for
war, or that the Lebanese struggle to liberate it will once again ignite the
northern border.
One could even hypothesize that the area would not be an obstacle if
there were currently peace talks between Israel and Syria.
It is, therefore, possible that the Syrian attack on the radar
installation created, without any prior intention, a meeting of interests
between Israel and Syria, where both sides are interested in getting rid of the
area, even if that means no negotiations on wider issues.
If Israel is convinced that the Shaba Farms do not contribute to its
security, it could, for example, suggest to Syria, rather than to Lebanon, that
it take them back in exchange for the Lebanese army deploying along its border
with Israel.
Then Israel could say that it did not cave in to Hezbollah terrorism
since it would hand the area over to Syria.
Syria would not be able to turn down such an offer, since if it did, it
would then have to explain to Lebanon and other Arab countries why it did not
take back what belongs to it rightfully.
The Lebanese government would no longer be able to use the excuse that
the Israel Defense Forces if still occupying Lebanese territory to further
stall its military deployment along the border.
Syria would be left to argue with Lebanon over the actual ownership of
the area, but that would no longer be Israel's business.
Moreover, Hezbollah's pretext for its continued military operations in
Lebanon would be pulled out from under it. Such advantages far outweigh those
associated with holding onto the area.
The only issue that remains is that of setting a political precedent,
namely that Israel would withdraw from occupied Syrian territory, without
broader negotiations, something which could be interpretted as a pullback
without any apposition.
But this is no precedent. Israel withdrew from Syrian territory after
the 1973 Yom Kippur War, it withdrew from south Lebanon without an agreement,
and it still holds the most important playing card to force negotiations with
Syria - the Golan Heights.
The Shaba Farms can be spared.